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The current literature on the tourism-economic growth causal relationship has not yet
reached to a clear empirical consensus. The aim of this paper is to revisit this ambiguous
relationship by examining the dynamics between tourism and economic growth from a more
holistic view. In particular, we focus on 113 countries over the period 1995–2011, which we
group into clusters based on six different criteria. A Panel Vector Autoregressive model is
employed to reveal the tourism–economy interdependencies across these clusters. Overall,
our findings cannot support the tourism–led economic growth hypothesis in any of our clus-
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1 Introduction
The link between tourism and economic growth has received considerable attention and gener-
ated a great amount of research in international tourism studies. Relevant scholarly work on
this topic sought to address the question of whether there is a causal direction of effects between
the tourism sector and national economies. This question was mainly approached through time-
series analyses of individual countries, or on some occasions, through cross-section and panel
data models (see, inter alia, Chen and Chiou-Wei, 2009; Apergis and Payne, 2012; Chang et al.,
2012; Chatziantoniou et al., 2013).
The bulk of these studies postulate the existence of spillover effects between the two factors,
which run either from tourism to the economy (the tourism-led economic growth hypothesis)
or from the economy to tourism (the economic-driven tourism growth hypothesis) (see, Parrilla
et al., 2007; Payne and Mervar, 2010; Schubert et al., 2011, among others). At the same time,
there are researchers who support the existence of bidirectional causalities or no causalities at
all (see, for example, Katircioglu, 2009; Ridderstaat et al., 2014; Antonakakis et al., 2015). The
aim of this paper is to shed some more light on this ambiguous relationship by examining the
dynamic links between tourism and economic growth in 113 countries over the period 1995-2011.
In particular, we attempt to disentangle the intricate tourism and economic growth relation-
ship through the application of a Panel Vector Autoregressive model (PVAR) approach along
with impulse response functions to data on tourism (proxied by either international tourism re-
ceipts, international tourism expenditures or international tourist arrivals) and economic growth.
We argue that the degree of economic growth that is attributable to tourism (or the reverse)
may depend on various country–specific characteristics. For this reason, we cluster our sample
countries on the basis of six different criteria: their (a) cost of living, (b) level of development, (c)
government effectiveness, (d) political regime, (e) level of tourism specialisation and (f) tourism
competitiveness.
This is an effort to build a comprehensive and up-to-date study on the tourism-economic
growth nexus across the globe that takes into account the key dynamics that influence tourism
and broader economic performance.
The advantages of using a panel VAR methodology relative to methods previously used
to examine the relation between tourism and economic growth are several. First, VARs are
extremely useful when there is little or ambiguous theoretical information regarding the re-
lationships among the variables to guide the specification of the model. Second, and more
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importantly, VARs are explicitly designed to address the endogeneity problem, which is one
of the most serious challenges of the empirical research on tourism and economic growth. Re-
searchers such as Lee and Chang (2008), Holzner (2011) and Chang et al. (2012) raise the issue
of endogeneity. VARs help to alleviate the endogeneity problem by treating all variables as
potentially endogenous and explicitly modelling the feedback effects across the variables.
Third, impulse response functions based on VARs can account for any delayed effects on and
of the variables under consideration and thus, determine whether the effects between tourism
and growth are either short-run, long-run or both. Such dynamic effects cannot be captured
by panel regressions. Forth, panel VARs allow us to include country fixed effects that capture
time–invariant components that may affect tourism and growth, such as country size. Fifth,
time fixed effects can also be added to account for any global (macroeconomic) shocks that may
affect all countries in the same way. Last but not least, panel VARs can be effectively employed
with relative short–time series due to the efficiency gained from the cross–sectional dimension.
The results of this study find no support for the tourism–led economic growth hypothesis in
either developed or developing economies. Rather, developing economies present an economy–
driven relationship with their tourism sector, whereas developed ones exhibit no causalities,
especially in the long–run. This finding suggests that tourism does not yet serve as a strong
driver for economic development or the elimination of poverty, which may be due to the high
tourism spending that leaks away from poor destinations. In addition, countries with highly
competitive tourism product – in terms of price, government effectiveness, political stability and
high number of world heritage sites – do not exhibit any relationship between tourism and the
economy, and only when competitiveness levels are moderate a mutual causal relationship is
observed.
In short, these results are important for policy makers for countries that belong to specific
clusters. For instance, the neutral relationship between tourism and economic growth that holds
for the more mature and highly specialised groups of countries, suggests that their policymaking
for tourism should be independent from their other economic activities. On the other hand, in
developing and less tourism–competitive contexts, future policies need to consider the restruc-
turing of the tourism sector in order to decrease tourism income leakages and increase tourism
impact on general growth. At the same time, poverty–alleviation strategies should perhaps con-
sider placing more emphasis on other sectors of the economy, rather than tourism, as drivers for
development.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the relevant
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literature. Section 3 describes the data and classifications used for this study, whereas section
4 presents the econometric approach. Section 5 reports the empirical results from our analysis
and section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Literature review
During the past decades, tourism studies exhibited a growing interest in the relationship between
tourism and the wider economy. Relevant work sought to explore the causal direction of effects
between a country’s international tourism presence and its overall economic performance. In
particular, they attempted to define whether tourism activity drives the growth of host economies
or whether national economies prompt tourism expansion. The product of this extended line of
enquiry is a mosaic of different, often opposing interpretations that render this area of research
inconclusive and still open to discussion.
More specifically, there is a considerable number of studies which provide evidence of the
existence of a unidirectional relationship, either from tourism to the economy – also known as
the tourism–led economic growth (TLEG) hypothesis – or from the economy to tourism – the
so–called economic–driven tourism growth (EDTG) hypothesis. Indicatively, the empirical work
of Parrilla et al. (2007) in Spain, Schubert et al. (2011) in Antigua and Barbuda and Eeckels et al.
(2012) in Greece advocate for the TLEG hypothesis, suggesting that the tourism specialisation
of these countries enhances their overall growth rates. On the other hand, Payne and Mervar
(2010) in Croatia, Tang (2011) in Malaysia and Chatziantoniou et al. (2013) in France hold that
it is the economic growth of state economies that stimulates tourism development and not its
antipode.
Apart from the unidirectional hypotheses, some scholars have found that the causal relation-
ship between tourism and the economy can be of bilateral character running in both directions.
For instance, the findings of Chen and Chiou-Wei (2009) in South Korea and Ridderstaat et al.
(2014) in Aruba lend support to the bidirectional hypothesis, according to which there are mu-
tual influences across the tourism–economy nexus. At the same time, there are occasions in
which all the aforementioned propositions are rejected, as in the cases of Katircioglu (2009) in
Turkey and Tang and Jang (2009) in the US where no causal links between the two factors can
be confirmed. Furthermore, Antonakakis et al. (2015) find that the tourism-economic growth
relationship is not stable over time; rather, it is very responsive to major economic events.
It is apparent that the existing literary work does not provide a single interpretation, which
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can describe the tourism–economy dipole catholically. It is also worth commenting that in their
majority, relevant studies narrow their focus on specific case–study areas. However, researchers
such as Lee and Chang (2008) and Dritsakis (2012) argue that a cross–sectional analysis of
the tourism–economy dynamics allows for a more in–depth and comparative examination of
different groups of countries. In addition, it is plausible to propose that the use of panel data
can decrease endogeneity through the consideration of specific country effects, omitted variables,
reverse causality and measurement error.
Indeed, there is an emerging strand of the literature which follows the panel data approach.
Studies across this path of research most commonly group their countries according to their
geographical proximity. For example, Narayan et al. (2010) explore four Pacific islands, whereas
Dritsakis (2012) examines a selection of Mediterranean destinations. Using panel cointegration
tests, both studies postulate the TLEG hypothesis. Further, Apergis and Payne (2012) choose
to investigate nine Caribbean states where the panel error correction model reveals bi–causal
links. Similarly, Lee and Brahmasrene (2013) employ both techniques for 27 European Union
member countries confirming a positive effect of tourism on economic growth.
There are also some studies that use panel data comprising countries from all across the
globe. Indicatively, Holzner (2011) examines 134 countries and observes that tourism impacts
positively on national economies although not at a particularly high degree. Further, Ivanov
and Webster (2013) consider the effect of globalisation on tourism’s contribution to economic
growth in 167 countries, concluding that globalisation plays no significant role.
The focus on a large number of countries has certain advantages, nevertheless sensitivity
analysis, through the classification of countries into different groups, could provide a more in–
depth insight on the tourism–growth relationship. In this respect, there are some papers that
classify their sample countries based on specific criteria.
A characteristic example is the work of Lee and Chang (2008) who apart from a geographical
classification (Asian, Latin American and Sub-Saharan African), they also divide their 55 sample
countries into OECD and non–OECD members. The researchers report that the nature of the
tourism–economic growth relationship demonstrates differences depending on their region or
OECD membership. For example, there is a long–run TLEG causality for OECD countries,
while for non–OECD countries this causality is bidirectional. The latter finding is also reported
for Latin America and sub–Sahara Africa but no long–run relationship is confirmed for Asia.
Another case in point is that of Sequeira and M. Nunes (2008) who divide their case–study
areas in small (based on demographics) and poor countries (based on per capital GDP) to
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investigate whether the effect of tourism on the economy is significantly higher for these clusters
as compared to international average. They demonstrate that tourism specialisation is more
crucial for poor countries; a case that does not hold for small ones. Similar studies that group
countries based on the type of their economy are these of Seetanah (2011), who concentrates on
a sample of island economies and reports bidirectional causality between tourism and economic
growth, and Chou (2013), who narrows his enquiry down to transition economies using panel
Granger causality tests, yet no clear pattern is revealed.
Apart from the aforementioned, researchers may employ alternative classifications to filter
their enquiry of the tourism–economy relationship. For instance, Arezki et al. (2009) assess 127
countries, using as an indicator their tourism specialisation based on their number of UNESCO
World Heritage Sites (WHS). They report that the latter increases the positive effects of tourism
on economic growth. More interestingly, Chang et al. (2012) group 159 countries into two clusters
(high and low regimes) for each of three classifications; their trade openness, their investment
share to GDP and their share of government consumption to GDP. They find evidence that
countries which belong to low regimes tend to exhibit a stronger TLEG relationship whereas
economies at high regimes do not always enjoy significant tourism effects.
As encapsulated in the previous paragraphs, scholars have recently shown a strong interest
in examining multiple countries rather than isolated cases. However, the vast majority of these
studies either use no or a mere classification for sample countries, such as a geographic–based
characteristic or an economic criterion. There are only but few attempts to introduce various
classifications within the same study (as in the case of Chang et al., 2012). Furthermore, all
papers that use panel data and/or country classifications select a priori a causal relationship,
which could flow from either tourism or the economy. This paper aims to extend this strand of
the literature, by analysing panel data through a complete set of six characteristics, as it will be
explained in section 3, using a PVAR approach, which allows the data itself to reveal the actual
causal direction, instead of a priori defining the nature of this relationship.
3 Data
In this study we collect annual data from the World Development Indicators database maintained
by the World Bank for per capita international tourism receipts (ITRCPT), tourism expenditures
(ITEXP) and tourist arrivals (ITARR) as a percentage of GDP, over the period 1995–2011 for
113 developed and developing countries (totalling 1921 observations). The use of three different
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proxies for tourism income was chosen for robustness purposes. However, for the sake of brevity,
we present the findings that are based only on international tourism receipts. The results from
using tourism expenditures and tourist arrivals are qualitatively similar and available from the
authors upon request.
Furthermore, we obtain annual data for real GDP per capita (in 2005 US$, GDPPC), level
of development, government effectiveness (GOVEFF), polity IV index (POLREG), number of
UNESCO WHS (TOURSPEC) and travel and tourism competitiveness index (TTCI), as criteria
for our classifications of countries. Real GDP per capita and government effectiveness scores
were obtained from the World Development Indicators database maintained by the World Bank.
The classification of the countries between developed and developing follows the United Nations’
classification. Data for the polity IV index are accessed through the Polity IV project website
(www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm). Finally, information on the number of UNESCO
WHS is retrieved from UNESCO’s website (whc.unesco.org/en/list), whereas data regarding
the travel and tourism competitiveness index are acquired from the World Economic Forum
(www.weforum.org/reports/travel-and-tourism-competitiveness-report-2013).
Based on the aforementioned data, we proceed with the classification of the 113 countries
using the following criteria:
a. Cost of living. We classify countries into three distinct groups based on their GDP per capita.
The rationale behind this is that high costs of living would imply high relative prices within
the destination and the reverse. Thus, tourism prices, shaped largely by the cost of living in
one destination and compared to tourism prices/cost of living in alternative destinations can
influence affordability and destination choice (Song and Wong, 2003). On this premise, it will be
interesting to investigate whether they also influence tourism success in stimulating the economy.
Figure 1 demonstrates countries classification from the least expensive to the most expensive,
moving from cluster 1 to 3. We have also considered the income group classification of the
World Bank and the results are qualitatively similar. However, for brevity we do not report
these results here but they are available upon request.
[Insert Figure 1 around here]
b. Level of development. We distinguish between developed and developing countries to assess
whether any differences exist between the way that tourism affects their economies. This is a
particularly current issue given that tourism is often presented as a driver for poverty alleviation
(see, for instance, UNWTO and SNV, 2010). For this to hold, we would expect a TLEG
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relationship in developing economies. In fact, the study of the tourism–economy relationship in
the context of developing countries has attracted some attention and was not always backed up
by empirical evidence (see, inter alia Ekanayake and Long, 2012). Thus, it is considered valuable
to also use this clustering and try to shed some more light on this critical question. Table 1
provides a list of developed and developing countries.
[Insert Table 1 around here]
c. Government effectiveness. We consider some additional parameters, such as a country’s level
of bureaucracy, given that this can also influence the success of its tourism product. One salient
example is the ease of issuing a visa, which is proven to encourage visitation decisions (Cheng,
2012). Further, government–led administrative tasks which support tourism operations – such
as infrastructure provision – can influence the impact that the sector has on the national econ-
omy. Similarly, taxes levied on tourists and tourism–related businesses need to be redistributed
efficiently in order to make a positive impact (Gooroochurn and Sinclair, 2005). Overall, gov-
ernments play a central role in tourism as they provide the regulations for tourism planning and
management and thus, it is plausible to take their effectiveness into account. Figure 2 illustrates
the classification of our sample countries according to this criterion. The level of effectiveness
increases as we move from cluster 1 to 3.
[Insert Figure 2 around here]
d. Political regime. We distinguish countries based on their level of democracy. According to the
literature, we argue that more democratic countries exhibit higher political stability, which in
turn encourages economic development and tourism activity. Interestingly, there is evidence that
extended political unrest, as compared to one-off short-term political incidents, has remarkably
more devastating results for tourism (Fletcher and Morakabati, 2008). Thus, it makes sense
to assume that long-term political turbulence can severely hit tourism and the economy as a
whole. Figure 3 presents this grouping of countries, based on the polity IV index, where cluster
1 denotes authoritarian or hybrid regimes (i.e. a mix of democratic regimes with autocratic
traits), 2 refers to democracy and 3 to full democracy.
[Insert Figure 3 around here]
e. Level of tourism specialisation. We group countries based on their number of UNESCO WHS,
with the more WHS to reflect more specialised destinations, similarly to Arezki et al. (2009). The
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WHS list may include monuments, groups of buildings, forests, lakes, mountains and other areas
of special cultural and/or physical significance (UNESCO, 1972). It is a list with international
geographic coverage, recognised by 191 countries. As argued by Arezki et al. (2009) and Yang
et al. (2010), the existence of a high number of sites ascribed with the UNESCO status is likely
to affect growth through tourism activity. Indeed, the WHS list has been evolved into a strong
marketing tool for tourism, although some researchers have recently raised their doubts with
regards to the WHS fostering effect on tourism and economic growth (see, for instance, Cellini,
2011; Huang et al., 2012). Figure 4 demonstrates this classification, with cluster 1 being the
countries with the lowest and 3 the countries with the highest levels of tourism specialisation.
[Insert Figure 4 around here]
f. Tourism competitiveness. We adopt the travel and tourism competitiveness index that com-
bines some of the aforementioned characteristics. More specifically, TTCI is constructed on the
basis of policy rules and regulations, which relate to our government effectiveness and political
regime criteria here, price competitiveness which is approximated by the cost of living in our
study, and cultural resources, which are represented by the tourism specialisation number of
WHS factor we employ. Thus, the tourism competitiveness clustering will also allow us to com-
pare and corroborate our TTCI results with the results of individual criteria. Table 2 provides
the list of countries based on this categorisation, with cluster 1 being the countries with the
lowest and 3 the countries with the highest levels of tourism competitiveness.
[Insert Table 2 around here]
Descriptive statistics of each variable and across country groups are presented in Tables 3
and 4.
3.1 Panel unit root tests
The first step for the investigation of causality is to determine whether the series has any
integration orders. For this purpose, this study employs panel unit root tests developed by
Levin et al. (2002) (hereafter LLC) and Im et al. (2003) (hereafter IPS).
The LLC (2002) unit root test considers the following panel ADF specification:
∆ lnYit = ρiYit−1 +
pi∑
j=1
δi,j∆ lnYit−j + εit, (1)
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where Yit is a vector of our key endogenous variables: tourism income per capita growth and
real GDP per capita growth.
The LLC (2002) assumes that the persistence parameters ρi are identical across cross-sections
(i.e., ρi = ρ for all i), whereas the lag order pi may freely vary. This procedure tests the null
hypothesis ρi = 0 for all i against the alternative hypothesis ρi < 0 for all i. Rejection of the
null hypothesis indicates a possible panel integration process.
The IPS (2003) test, which is also based on Eq. (1), differs from the LLC test by assuming
ρi to be heterogeneous across cross–sections. The IPS tests the null hypothesis H0: ρi < 0
against the alternative hypothesis H1: ρi < 0, (i = 1, ..., N1); ρi = 0, (i = N1, ..., N) for all i.
Acceptance of the alternative hypothesis allows the individual series to be integrated.
The LLC and IPS tests were executed on data both in levels and first differences of the
natural logarithms, and results were reported in Table 5. It is evident that all variables are
stationary in first differences, while the level results indicate the presence of a unit root in
general.
[Insert Table 5 here]
3.2 Panel Granger–causality
Next we examine the direction of causality among GDP per capita growth and tourism income
per capita growth in a panel context. The Granger causality test is as follows:
∆ ln git = α1t +
mlgi∑
l=1
β1i,l∆ ln git−l +
mltii∑
l=1
γ1i,l∆ ln tiit−l + ε1it
∆ ln tiit = α2t +
mlgi∑
l=1
β2i,l∆ ln git−l +
mltii∑
l=1
γ2i,l∆ ln tiit−l + ε2it, (2)
where index i refers to the country, t to the time period (t = 1, ..., T ) and l to the lag. ∆ ln g
denotes the real GDP per capita growth, ∆ ln ti denotes tourism income per capita growth (as
this is approximated by tourism receipts, tourism expenditures and tourist arrivals), and ε1it,
ε2it and ε3it are supposed to be white-noise errors.
For instance, according to model (2), in country group i there is Granger causality running
only from ti to g if in the first equation not all γ1i’s are zero but all β1i’s and δ1i are zero. The
Chi2 statistic tests the null of no causal relationship for any of the cross-section units, against
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the alternative hypothesis that causal relationships occur for at least one subgroup of the panel.
Rejection of the null hypothesis indicates, for example, that ti Granger causes g for all i.
The results of the panel Granger-causality test are reported in Table 6.
[Insert Table 6 here]
According to these results, some interesting patterns are revealed. In particular, it is evident
that economic growth primarily drives tourism growth and this is a first indication that possibly
it is the EDTG that prevails. Nevertheless, there are cases (such as in the GOVEFF3 and
TOURSPEC3 clusters), where a bidirectional causality is demonstrated, suggesting that in
countries with greater government effectiveness and tourism specialisation there is a feedback
effect between the two variables. In addition, a TLEG relationship is reported in the case of
COSTLIV3 cluster. Overall, the inference that we draw from this preliminary analysis is that
the choice of different criteria and clusters adds value to the discussion of the tourism–growth
relationship, given that heterogeneous behaviour is observed. Although the economic growth
is the prevailing driver, there is evidence of heterogeneity among the Granger causality test
in many of the country groups, which motivates the use of generalised forecast error variance
decomposition in our impulse response analysis (for more details, please refer to the next section).
4 Empirical methodology
4.1 Clustering approach
To classification of countries in the aforementioned 3 clusters for the cost of living, government
effectiveness, political regime, level of tourism specialisation and tourism competitiveness is
based on the k-means clustering method (the level of development criterion has only 2 clusters
and these are given by the United Nations). The k-means clustering approach aims to partition
n observations (in our case countries) into k clusters in which each observation belongs to the
cluster with the nearest mean, serving as a prototype of the cluster.
Specifically, given a set of observations (x1, x2, ..., x − n), where each observation is a d-
dimensional real vector, k-means clustering aims to partition the n observations into k(n) sets
S = {S1, S2, ..., Sk} so as to minimize the within-cluster sum of squares (WCSS). In other
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words, its objective is to find:
arg min
S
k∑
i=1
∑
xSi
‖‖x− µi‖‖2 (3)
where µi is the mean of points in Si.
Our results presented here are based on k(n)=3 set, since this number resulted in an ample
amount of countries (and therefore observations to perform our analysis) in each set/cluster.
However, these results remain robust to alternative values of sets/clusters, such as 2 or 4. The
latter results are available upon request.
4.2 Panel VAR approach
The panel VAR methodology combines the traditional VAR approach, which treats all the vari-
ables in the system as endogenous, with the panel-data approach, which allows for unobserved
individual heterogeneity. In its general form, our model can be written as follows:
∆ lnYit = A0 +A1∆ lnYit−j +A2Xit + µi + λt + εit (4)
where Yit is a vector of our key variables: tourism income and economic growth. The autore-
gressive structure allows all endogenous variables to enter the model with a number of j lags.
Xit is a vector of the exogenous variables, which are used as control variables, comprising: (i)
labour force participation rate, capturing labour input, (ii) gross fixed capital formation as a
% of GDP, measuring capital input, and (iii) imports plus exports over GDP, capturing the
degree of openness. The data for the exogenous variables have been obtained from the World
Development Indicators database.
The advantage of the panel VAR is the same as the advantage of any panel approach; i.e.,
it allows for the explicit inclusion of a fixed effect in the model, denoted µi, which captures all
unobservable time–invariant factors at a country level. This is important for our purposes as
the inclusion of these fixed effects allows each country to have a country specific level of each
of the factors in the model, and, in addition, to capture other time-invariant factors, such as
country size and number of heritage sites. However, inclusion of fixed effects presents an esti-
mation challenge, which arises in any model which includes lags of the dependent variables: the
fixed effects are correlated with the regressors and, therefore, the mean–differencing procedure
commonly used to eliminate fixed effects would create biased coefficients.
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To avoid this problem we use forward mean-differencing, also referred to as the ‘Helmert
procedure’ (Arellano and Bover, 1995). This procedure removes only the forward mean, i.e.,
the mean of all the future observations available for each country-year. This transformation
preserves the orthogonality between transformed variables and lagged regressors, which allows
us to use lagged regressors as instruments and estimate the coefficients by system GMM. In our
case the model will be just identified because the number of regressors will equal the number of
instruments; therefore, system GMM is numerically equivalent to equation-by-equation 2SLS.
Our panel VAR estimation routine follows Love and Zicchino (2006) and Love and Rima (2014).
Another benefit of the panel data is that allows for common time effects, λt, which are added
to model (4) to capture any global (macroeconomic) shocks that may affect all countries in the
same way. For example, time effects capture common factors such as interest rates, spreads or
global risk factors. To deal with the time effects, we time difference all the variables prior to
inclusion in the model, which is equivalent to putting time dummies in the system.
Model 4 above is commonly referred to as reduced form, in a sense that each equation
only contains lagged values of all other variables in the system. The prime benefit of the VAR
system is that allows the evaluation of the effect of the orthogonal shocks i.e., the impact of
a shock of one variable on another variable, while keeping all other variables constant. This
is accomplished with the use of impulse-response functions, which identify the reaction of one
variable to the innovations in another variable in the system, while holding all other shocks
equal to zero. However, since (i) the actual variance-covariance matrix of the errors is unlikely
to be diagonal (e.g. errors are correlated), (ii) the results of the panel Granger causality tests
revealed heterogeneous results among our variables/clusters and (iii) given that any particular
ordering of the variables in our PVAR model would be hard to justify, we use the generalised
PVAR framework (in the spirit of Koop et al., 1996; Pesaran and Shin, 1998), in which forecast
error variance decompositions are invariant to the ordering of the variables.
To analyze the impulse–response functions, and to evaluate their statistical significance we
estimate their confidence intervals. Since the matrix of impulse-response functions is constructed
from the estimated VAR coefficients, their standard errors need to be taken into account. We
generate the confidence intervals for the generalised impulse responses using Monte Carlo sim-
ulations.
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5 Empirical findings
We begin our analysis with the full sample results as these are illustrated in Figure 5. Our
analysis is based on international tourism receipts as a proxy for tourism growth.
[Insert Figure 5 around here]
We observe that although there is a bidirectional relationship between the tourism indus-
try and economic growth during the first four years, the relationship subsequently turns into
economy-driven. Thus, for the full sample estimation our results mainly coincide with the
EDTG hypothesis, which implies that it is the economic performance of the sample countries
that drives their tourism sectors. Nevertheless, the consideration of the full sample can only
lead us to drawing some tentative conclusions, as the special qualities of our sample countries
remain unmasked. Therefore, it would be interesting to isolate their particular characteristics
and examine each ones effect on the tourism-economy relationship.
Initially, we divide our full sample of countries on the basis of their cost of living and the
results are presented in Figure 6.
[Insert Figure 6 around here]
We observe that it is the least expensive countries (Cost of Living cluster 1) that confirm
the EDTG in the longer run. This is perhaps surprising given that we would expect that the
countries with lower cost of living, which are mainly the less developed ones, would be more
responsive to export activity. Yet, this can be explained by the structure of the tourism industry
in these destinations i.e. the number of outsiders and the high level of leakages of tourism income
from their local economies.
As Perez and Juaneda (2000) explain, package deals contract out mass tourism destinations,
meaning that visitors purchase their transport–accommodation package at home. This inevitably
confines spending at destinations to pocket money payments and decreases tourism income
considerably. The fact though that the economy drives the tourism sector in these countries can
be potentially explained by the fact that weaker economies have limited ability to exploit their
resources or develop their infrastructure in order to support their home industries, including
tourism.
In high–cost destination countries (cluster 3) exists an extremely short-lived bidirectional
relationship. However, after two years we observe that there is no effect neither from tourism
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to the economy nor the reverse. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to argue that high cost of living
is mostly found in mature economies where tourism is a peripheral and not a core economic
activity. For example, the tourism sector in the US is about 2.7% of the national income.
In contrast, in countries with moderate cost of living, we observe a clear bidirectional re-
lationship. It should be underlined that a considerable number of the countries that comprise
this cluster have popular tourism products (e.g. Croatia, Cyprus, Malta, Portugal and Spain)
and tourism is an important industry for their economies. In particular, according to the World
Travel and Tourism Council, the tourism industry in Croatia contributes 27.8% of its GDP, in
Cyprus 20.6%, in Malta 25.5%, in Portugal 15.6% and in Spain 15.7%.
Overall, the results imply that the relationship between tourism and economic growth is
influenced by the cost of living, which as mentioned previously reflects the price of the tourism
product.
Our second classification is based on countries level of development. In this case, we have
two sub–groups, namely developed and developing countries (see Figure 7).
[Insert Figure 7 around here]
For developed countries, we observe a short–lived bidirectional relationship, which fades out
in the long run. In essence, we do not find evidence of any strong relationship between tourism
and economic growth for this cluster of countries. Furthermore, in developing countries, we see
again a short-lived bidirectional relationship; however, and in contrast to developed countries,
this turns into an EDTG relationship, given that the responses of tourism receipts to economic
growth shocks are persistent. Our finding does not offer support to the argument that the
contribution of tourism to economic growth is greater for developing countries than it is for the
developed ones (see Dritsakis, 2012).
Next, Figure 8 exhibits our findings with regards to government effectiveness.
[Insert Figure 8 around here]
Interestingly, we observe that in the two extremes, i.e. high and low levels of bureaucracy
(cluster 3 and 1, respectively) the relationship between tourism and the economy in the first
couple of years is bidirectional and thence turns into economic–driven. High levels of bureaucracy
hinder economic activities and may exert a negative influence on various economic sectors,
including tourism. Similarly, when the levels of bureaucracy are low, economic activity and
investment are encouraged and facilitated by the state and thus, it makes sense to promote
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tourism activity as well. Further, when government effectiveness is medium the relationship
remains bidirectional throughout the whole study period.
As far as the influences of political regimes on the tourism-economy relationship are con-
cerned, these are illustrated in Figure 9.
[Insert Figure 9 around here]
As can be seen in Figure 9, an EDTG relationship is witnessed in countries with authoritarian
or hybrid regimes (cluster 1). The interpretation of such finding is twofold; first, it can be argued
that in many instances authoritarian practices create a turbulent environment for economic
activities and hence, for all economic sectors including tourism. This incurs in non-democratic
regimes as governments often employ a rent-seeking behaviour to gain political support rather
than providing public goods (Plu¨mper and Martin, 2003).
Second, it has been established by the political economy literature that it is common for
economies which lack democracy to be controlled by a single individual or a small group of
individuals. Such power imbalances do not allow the economy to grow or to spread the benefits
of economic activity across society due to corruption (de Vaal and Ebben, 2011; Drury et al.,
2006; Mo, 2001). Thus, we maintain that the way that the economy is controlled in non–
democratic states influences tourism growth.
In contrast, the clusters of countries with democracy (cluster 2) or full democracy (cluster
3) exhibit a bidirectional relationship, although this is short-lived for cluster 3. It is suggested
that countries with either flawed or full democratic regimes are able to exploit the maximum
capacity of their economies and consequently, are at a good position to support investment in
their various sectors. Moreover, given that the benefits from each sector can be shared more
fairly across society it is reasonable to argue that sectoral performance (in our case, tourism)
could assist economic growth.
When considering tourism specialisation, defined as the number of WHS, we discern that
regions of high or medium specialisation exhibit zero relationship between tourism and economic
growth for most of our study frame, apart from the first few years of the impulse response
period where a bidirectional relationship is evident (see Figure 10). In contrast, when tourism
specialisation is low the bidirectional causality is witnessed for a short time period whereas in
consecutive years the economy maintains the lead in the transmission of effects.
[Insert Figure 10 around here]
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Hence, it appears that tourism specialisation exerts a quasi-opposite effect on destinations, a
phenomenon for which might lie various explanations. First, we need to take into account the fact
that it is the countries themselves that need to develop the nomination proposals for any site in
their territory. Consequently, an inclusion to the list requires the use of resources (for conducting
the necessary studies) and a certain level of government effectiveness and collaboration for
meeting the nomination criteria (i.e. presenting a holistic approach as required by UNESCO).
Given this set of circumstances, it can be argued that it is often the more developed and
government efficient countries, which tend to achieve the WHS status for a higher number of
sites as compared to the less developed ones (for instance, there are 7 WHS in Egypt as compared
to 41 and 40 sites in France and Germany, respectively).
Second, although WHS may also include places of natural significance, the vast majority of
listed sites are of cultural character (i.e. 802 out of 1031). There are some destinations with
a low level of tourism specialisation which tend to be less popular for their cultural offer and
more famous for their exoticism (for instance, the Bahamas, Dominican Republic, Mauritius
and Seychelles). The so-called sea-sun-sand tourism offer in these regions might stimulate some
wider economic responses that are nonetheless short-lived, perhaps due to the low spending
character of sea-sun-sand visitors (Taylor et al., 1993).
Third, some of the countries in the low specialisation cluster have a significantly less devel-
oped tourism sector or significant geopolitical turbulence, which explains the fact that tourism
does not affect their economic growth significantly (for example, Angola, Kazakhstan and Sierra
Leone).
Finally, when we take into account the tourism competitiveness index we observe that the
results resemble those from the cost of living, political regime and tourism specialisation clusters
(see Figure 11), which provides an additional robustness to our existing findings.
[Insert Figure 11 around here]
6 Summary and concluding remarks
Existing empirical evidence on the tourism-economic growth relationship has been inconclusive
so far and has led to various, often contradictory, interpretations of their causal direction of
effects. This might be the result of focusing on a single country or cluster of countries by using
panel regression models. We suggest that panel regression can be rather problematic when
addressing this question, as the existence of causal effects is considered given. In contrast, this
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paper employs Panel VAR analysis, where the direction of effects is not a priori selected but
rather allows for both variables to interact simultaneously.
At the same time, this study seeks to evaluate the said relationship not by grouping countries
based on a single characteristic but rather, by considering a set of six different criteria that
influence the tourism-economy dynamics. Our broad sample of 113 counties allows us to make
generalisations more securely, whereas the use of three different proxies for tourism growth i.e.
international tourism receipts, tourist arrivals, and tourism expenditure, as percentages of GDP,
adds to the robustness of our findings.
The results of this study cannot support the existence of a tourism-led economic growth
relationship, in neither mature nor emerging economies. Rather, tourism sectors in developing
countries appear to be economy–driven - a finding that rejects the idea of tourism as a poverty
alleviation driver. In mature economies, the causal hypotheses are also rejected, as the effects
between the two factors are negligible. Interestingly, countries with highly competitive tourism
product, where we would expect a more dynamic role for tourism, exhibit no long-term effects.
The only exception is for countries with moderate competitiveness levels, where a mutual causal
relationship is observed. Similarly, countries with democratic regimes and long-term political
stability, which could encourage tourism, show no causal effects between the two factors.
Such findings imply that policy makers in developing and less tourism-competitive countries
could either seek to restructure their tourism sector by decreasing tourism income leakages or
place more emphasis on other sectors when designing policies for economic development. In
addition, those developing countries with significant tourism activity could apply a safety net
to their tourism industry with the view to isolate influences of the economy, in cases of negative
economic shocks.
At the same time, highly competitive and mature economies can develop tourism policies,
which would be independent from their economic activity, given the neutral relationship between
tourism and economic growth. Those who should pay more attention to their tourism sector are
the countries that exhibit bidirectional causalities i.e. countries with moderate cost of living,
government efficiency and competitive levels, as there exists the potential for tourism to foster
economic growth.
Finally, an interesting avenue for further research is to investigate the potential indirect
relationship between tourism and economic growth with the use of PVAR models and multiple
endogenous variables (such as employment or infrastructure).
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Figure 1: Cost of living classification
 
Note: Moving from cluster 1 to 3 this figure demonstrates the least expensive to the most expensive countries.
Clusters in this classification are denoted as COSTLIV1, COSTLIV2 and COSTLIV3.
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Figure 2: Government effectiveness classification
 
Note: Moving from cluster 1 to 3 this figure demonstrates the countries with the least government effectiveness
to the most government effectiveness. Clusters in this classification are denoted as GOVEFF1, COVEFF2 and
GOVEFF3.
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Figure 3: Political regime classification
 
Note: Cluster 1 denotes authoritarian or hybrid regimes (i.e. a mix of democratic regimes with autocratic traits),
2 refers to democracy and 3 to full democracy. Clusters in this classification are denoted as POLREG1, POLREG2
and POLREG3.
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Figure 4: Tourism specialisation classification
 
Note: Moving from cluster 1 to 3 this figure demonstrates countries from the lowest to the highest levels of tourism
specialisation. Clusters in this classification are denoted as TOURSPEC1, TOURSPEC2 and TOURSPEC3.
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Figure 5: Impulse responses based on the full sample estimation for the period 1995-2011
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Figure 6: Impulse responses for the cost of living clusters estimation for the period 1995-2011
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Note: Impulse responses for clusters COSTLIV1, COSTLIV2 and COSTLIV3 are shown in the top, middle and
lower panels, respectively.
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Figure 7: Impulse responses for the level of development clusters estimation for the period
1995-2011
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Note: Impulse responses for developed and developing countries are shown in the top and lower panels, respectively.
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Figure 8: Impulse responses for the government effectiveness clusters estimation for the period
1995-2011
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Note: Impulse responses for clusters GOVEFF1, GOVEFF2 and GOVEFF3 are shown in the top, middle and
lower panels, respectively.
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Figure 9: Impulse responses for the political regime clusters estimation for the period 1995-2011
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Note: Impulse responses for clusters POLREG1, POLREG2 and POLREG3 are shown in the top, middle and
lower panels, respectively.
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Figure 10: Impulse responses for the tourism specialisation clusters estimation for the period
1995-2011
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Note: Impulse responses for clusters TOURSPEC1, TOURSPEC2 and TOURSPEC3 are shown in the top, middle
and lower panels, respectively.
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Figure 11: Impulse responses for the tourism competitiveness clusters estimation for the period
1995-2011
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Note: Impulse responses for clusters TTCI1, TTCI2 and TTCI3 are shown in the top, middle and lower panels,
respectively.
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Table 1: Developed and developing countries
Developed Countries Acronym Developing Countries Acronym
Australia AUS Albania ALB
Austria AUT Algeria DZA
Belgium BEL Angola AGO
Canada CAN Antigua and Barbuda ATG
Cyprus CYP Armenia ARM
Denmark DNK Azerbaijan AZE
Finland FIN Bahamas, The BHS
France FRA Bahrain BHR
Germany DEU Bangladesh BGD
Greece GRC Belarus BLR
Iceland ISL Belize BLZ
Italy ITA Bolivia BOL
Japan JPN Brazil BRA
Luxembourg LUX Bulgaria BGR
Malta MLT Burundi BDI
Netherlands NLD Cambodia KHM
New Zealand NZL Cape Verde CPV
Norway NOR Chile CHL
Portugal PRT China CHN
Spain ESP Colombia COL
Sweden SWE Costa Rica CRI
Switzerland CHE Croatia HRV
United Kingdom GBR Czech Republic CZE
United States USA Dominica DMA
Dominican Republic DOM
Ecuador ECU
Egypt, Arab Rep. EGY
El Salvador SLV
Estonia EST
Ethiopia ETH
Ghana GHA
Guatemala GTM
Honduras HND
Hong Kong SAR, China HKG
Hungary HUN
India IND
Indonesia IDN
Israel ISR
Jordan JOR
Kazakhstan KAZ
Kenya KEN
Korea, Rep. KOR
Kyrgyz Republic KGZ
Lao PDR LAO
Latvia LVA
Lesotho LSO
Lithuania LTU
Macedonia, FYR MKD
Malawi MWI
Malaysia MYS
Mali MLI
Mauritius MUS
Mexico MEX
Moldova MDA
Mongolia MNG
Morocco MAR
Namibia NAM
Nepal NPL
Nicaragua NIC
Pakistan PAK
Panama PAN
Paraguay PRY
Peru PER
Philippines PHL
Poland POL
Puerto Rico PRI
Romania ROM
Russian Federation RUS
Seychelles SYC
Sierra Leone SLE
Singapore SGP
Slovak Republic SVK
Slovenia SVN
South Africa ZAF
Sri Lanka LKA
St. Kitts and Nevis KNA
St. Lucia LCA
St. Vincent and the Grenadines VCT
Sudan SDN
Suriname SUR
Tanzania TZA
Thailand THA
Tunisia TUN
Turkey TUR
Ukraine UKR
Uruguay URY
Vanuatu VUT
Venezuela, RB VEN
Yemen, Rep. YEM
Notes: The classification of the countries follows the United Nations
(http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wesp/wesp current/2012country class.pdf).
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Table 2: Tourism competitiveness classification
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3
Burundi Kazakhstan Malaysia
Sierra Leone Cape Verde Greece
Lesotho Dominican Republic Czech Republic
Yemen Egypt Estonia
Algeria Colombia Cyprus
Mali Ecuador Italy
Malawi Philippines Korea, Rep.
Bangladesh Armenia Malta
Pakistan Albania Luxembourg
Ethiopia Azerbaijan Norway
Ghana Macedonia, FYR Denmark
Paraguay Ukraine Portugal
Venezuela Sri Lanka Belgium
Nepal Peru Finland
Kyrgyz Republic Indonesia Iceland
Bolivia Morocco Hong Kong SAR
Tanzania Romania Japan
Cambodia India Netherlands
El Salvador South Africa Australia
Moldova Russian Federation New Zealand
Mongolia Jordan Singapore
Suriname Uruguay Sweden
Guatemala Mauritius Canada
Kenya Chile France
Nicaragua Bahrain United States
Honduras Slovak Republic Spain
Namibia Israel United Kingdom
Puerto Rico Austria
Brazil Germany
Bulgaria Switzerland
Lithuania
Latvia
Costa Rica
Turkey
China
Mexico
Poland
Thailand
Hungary
Seychelles
Panama
Slovenia
Croatia
Notes: Moving from cluster 1 to 3 this table presents the countries with the lowest to the highest levels of
tourism competitiveness. Clusters in this classification are denoted as TTCI1, TTCI2 and TTCI3.
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics - Full sample & by level of development
All (113) countries
Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis JB Obs.
GDPPC 11494.08 87716.7 125.267 15058.36 1.805935 6.176781 1851.967* 1921
ITARR 0.899331 103.5508 0.001305 2.757344 27.56917 1004.059 80454658* 1921
ITEXP 1157.565 1298055 0.931889 29622.63 43.71802 1914.489 2.93E+08* 1921
ITRCPT 950.1868 310652.3 0.211532 7193.892 41.58684 1789.989 2.56E+08* 1921
GDPPCGR 0.026852 0.322496 -0.192922 0.039761 -0.063636 8.598306 2362.244* 1808
ITARRGR -0.027283 1.285837 -3.187505 0.228891 -3.931493 50.49608 174600.3* 1808
ITEXPGR -0.01051 2.391994 -4.056758 0.275857 -1.848721 40.66897 107924.2* 1808
ITRCPTGR -0.00541 3.486144 -3.693053 0.287256 -0.927068 39.35676 99835.66* 1808
Developed (24) countries
Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis JB Obs.
GDPPC 35964.04 87716.7 12029.1 14044.33 1.028633 4.481268 104.6983* 408
ITARR 1.195314 4.334277 0.022792 0.920678 1.253406 4.116075 122.6719* 408
ITEXP 1272.754 8199.729 205.2224 1288.248 3.100961 14.37908 2736.141* 408
ITRCPT 1481.641 10408.07 33.34613 1533.914 3.27536 15.74375 3344.923* 408
GDPPCGR 0.014595 0.067603 -0.094036 0.024298 -1.288398 5.699853 213.5793* 384
ITARRGR -0.000377 0.699153 -0.304769 0.083889 2.311326 20.40968 4975.143* 384
ITEXPGR 0.020899 0.78697 -0.809338 0.125713 -0.631055 12.32034 1356.412* 384
ITRCPTGR 0.019862 0.65214 -0.556933 0.112288 0.208364 7.373704 295.9785* 384
Developing (89) countries
Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis JB Obs.
GDPPC 5240.64 36654.2 125.267 6494.402 2.232226 8.227017 3012.382* 1513
ITARR 0.823691 103.5508 0.001305 3.050059 25.63831 844.7791 45340364* 1513
ITEXP 1128.128 1298055 0.931889 33188.39 39.04131 1526.137 1.48E+08* 1513
ITRCPT 814.3708 310652.3 0.211532 8018.444 37.75685 1459.006 1.36E+08* 1513
GDPPCGR 0.029985 0.322496 -0.192922 0.042266 -0.147388 8.192796 1623.121* 1424
ITARRGR -0.034159 1.285837 -3.187505 0.252512 -3.626462 42.34212 96024.43* 1424
ITEXPGR -0.018536 2.391994 -4.056758 0.302011 -1.691939 35.27606 63191.7* 1424
ITRCPTGR -0.011869 3.486144 -3.693053 0.316539 -0.819036 33.42185 55690.35* 1424
JB denote Jarque-Bera. * indicates 1 percent levels of significance. GR at the end of the acronym indicates
growth rates.
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics - By clusters
TTCI1 (27) countries
Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis JB Obs.
GDPPC 1228.767 6509.56 125.267 1299.705 1.84651 6.153373 451.0087 459
ITARR 0.241687 5.721794 0.001814 0.639674 5.636841 38.33109 26304.17 459
ITEXP 100.6293 4556.744 1.216888 312.7924 9.087286 107.7736 216262 459
ITRCPT 144.6121 3553.786 0.213871 420.8278 5.209136 31.61664 17737.53 459
GDPPCGR 0.022206 0.188315 -0.134202 0.035701 -0.425523 6.942423 292.8056 432
ITARRGR -0.047835 1.109634 -1.190441 0.241415 0.11032 7.317098 336.3483 432
ITEXPGR -0.039608 2.391994 -1.406037 0.315911 0.96197 14.23096 2337.046 432
ITRCPTGR -0.031945 1.981734 -1.172014 0.315255 0.598826 8.233209 518.7753 432
TTCI2 (43) countries
Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis JB Obs.
GDPPC 5530.38 22273.2 469.47 4883.41 1.608759 5.090203 448.3885 731
ITARR 0.791162 21.86591 0.001305 1.801211 5.491805 42.0602 50144.74 731
ITEXP 220.081 1968.311 0.931889 279.4399 2.606553 10.98921 2771.828 731
ITRCPT 542.6808 8978.95 1.351238 1111.748 4.713855 28.03761 21800.96 731
GDPPCGR 0.035472 0.322496 -0.192922 0.045255 -0.057747 9.348653 1155.804 688
ITARRGR -0.018933 0.970898 -2.289284 0.207042 -2.605282 27.62892 18167.04 688
ITEXPGR 0.002603 2.078599 -2.23065 0.243616 0.125204 24.89705 13746.92 688
ITRCPTGR 0.010353 1.704141 -2.398752 0.254747 -1.105612 20.63435 9054.643 688
TTCI3 (30) countries
Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis JB Obs.
GDPPC 31788.7 87716.7 4347.82 15210.49 0.752803 4.125135 75.0715 510
ITARR 1.143672 4.334277 0.022792 0.879543 1.24174 4.284655 166.1327 510
ITEXP 1188.96 8199.729 112.3175 1216.442 3.041678 14.86178 3776.316 510
ITRCPT 1380.55 10408.07 33.34613 1408.012 3.455973 18.06086 5835.348 510
GDPPCGR 0.018428 0.12238 -0.151659 0.03025 -0.898466 6.685249 336.2005 480
ITARRGR 0.006704 0.699153 -0.304769 0.091459 1.580741 12.8178 2127.684 480
ITEXPGR 0.026301 0.78697 -0.809338 0.139024 -0.792003 9.912194 1005.75 480
ITRCPTGR 0.022627 0.65214 -0.556933 0.122962 -0.039085 6.009634 181.2802 480
TOURSPEC1 (52) countries
Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis JB Obs.
GDPPC 8488.233 87716.7 143.784 13338.2 3.135171 14.77775 6557.534 884
ITARR 1.278075 103.5508 0.001305 3.850765 21.46493 564.6259 11685986 884
ITEXP 2032.746 1298055 0.931889 43660.43 29.63875 880.2962 28478153 884
ITRCPT 1501.56 310652.3 0.211532 10562.5 28.42043 832.0467 25435231 884
GDPPCGR 0.02865 0.322496 -0.192922 0.04567 0.287318 8.186297 943.8999 832
ITARRGR -0.027901 1.285837 -3.187505 0.256222 -3.121406 38.64856 45406.15 832
ITEXPGR -0.014528 2.391994 -4.056758 0.337054 -1.654793 36.07628 38306.45 832
ITRCPTGR -0.013003 3.486144 -3.693053 0.351575 -0.543128 34.16656 33714.53 832
TOURSPEC2 (37) countries
Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis JB Obs.
GDPPC 9031.524 67804.5 125.267 14583.85 2.233142 7.143084 972.6657 629
ITARR 0.555036 21.86591 0.004565 1.295358 9.674043 134.6462 464020.3 629
ITEXP 321.4999 4843.984 1.433224 592.208 3.278599 16.7047 6049.295 629
ITRCPT 380.7326 4176.351 2.431151 536.1074 2.551354 11.35548 2512.113 629
GDPPCGR 0.026382 0.13957 -0.155726 0.035138 -1.206907 8.091404 783.1394 592
ITARRGR -0.034094 0.996855 -2.978667 0.243614 -4.656795 52.84726 63430.14 592
ITEXPGR -0.021291 0.892941 -2.23065 0.23028 -2.017069 20.84152 8253.324 592
ITRCPTGR -0.005593 1.165318 -2.398752 0.251228 -1.674922 20.05372 7450.586 592
TOURSPEC3 (24) countries
Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis JB Obs.
GDPPC 21803.16 55377.8 469.47 14832.75 0.109136 1.777188 26.22952 408
ITARR 0.609507 9.611262 0.003583 0.726473 6.008995 66.78515 71620.62 408
ITEXP 550.2744 2156.211 1.996698 518.4523 1.063817 3.148408 77.33047 408
ITRCPT 633.4524 6726.391 4.959693 620.4063 3.246668 27.52915 10945.32 408
GDPPCGR 0.023683 0.127561 -0.081155 0.031794 -0.298181 4.226978 29.77793 384
ITARRGR -0.015445 0.46841 -0.891224 0.113798 -2.068053 17.06767 3440.106 384
ITEXPGR 0.014818 0.78697 -0.860433 0.172778 -0.8421 8.555931 539.2784 384
ITRCPTGR 0.011324 0.65214 -1.099978 0.152725 -1.836155 14.79871 2443.128 384
COSTLIV1 (47) countries
Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis JB Obs.
GDPPC 3022.652 23431.5 125.267 3224.797 3.360412 18.10887 9103.524 799
ITARR 0.451402 21.86591 0.001814 1.183919 10.46478 156.5551 799573.2 799
ITEXP 145.8588 4843.984 1.433224 345.49 9.470696 113.5095 418513.4 799
ITRCPT 246.3848 4176.351 0.483882 407.155 4.191859 28.03692 23208.76 799
GDPPCGR 0.03401 0.322496 -0.192922 0.044592 -0.022687 9.393733 1280.966 752
ITARRGR -0.037247 0.970898 -2.978667 0.240267 -4.124599 44.42038 55889.18 752
ITEXPGR -0.012083 2.078599 -2.23065 0.265033 -0.107304 18.53683 7565.095 752
ITRCPTGR 0.000381 1.981734 -2.398752 0.284368 -0.333141 16.37262 5617.151 752
COSTLIV2 (21) countries
Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis JB Obs.
GDPPC 15973.54 58009.8 469.47 10974.5 1.395372 5.460861 205.9309 357
ITARR 1.541968 11.19878 0.003583 2.014605 2.934195 12.16095 1760.621 357
ITEXP 696.2206 5433.309 1.996698 844.9525 2.45542 10.06312 1100.811 357
ITRCPT 1171.396 6726.391 4.959693 1021.027 1.221917 4.902895 142.7008 357
GDPPCGR 0.025146 0.12238 -0.151659 0.035741 -0.891848 5.269179 116.6304 336
ITARRGR -0.010759 0.675201 -0.891224 0.146277 -1.372665 12.42054 1347.966 336
ITEXPGR 0.010065 0.553917 -0.860433 0.171198 -0.830307 6.627499 222.8295 336
ITRCPTGR 0.002499 0.459883 -0.857649 0.160462 -1.011656 7.193418 303.4997 336
COSTLIV3 (20) countries
Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis JB Obs.
GDPPC 36529.86 87716.7 4560.64 14602.89 0.713278 4.800473 74.75419 340
ITARR 1.124493 9.869915 0.022792 1.319372 3.283036 17.22509 3477.443 340
ITEXP 1284.297 8199.729 84.53983 1278.926 3.346491 16.1225 3074.109 340
ITRCPT 1531.502 10408.07 33.34613 1945.29 2.647843 9.335231 965.8755 340
GDPPCGR 0.014416 0.067603 -0.094036 0.02274 -1.288843 6.204541 225.514 320
ITARRGR -0.006151 0.699153 -0.399984 0.09066 1.851706 19.28896 3720.605 320
ITEXPGR 0.015845 0.415732 -0.340079 0.106129 -0.212945 3.797999 10.90913 320
ITRCPTGR 0.018931 0.65214 -0.296196 0.110067 0.789287 7.188552 267.1448 320
JB denote Jarque-Bera. * indicates 1 percent levels of significance. GR at the end of the acronym indicates
growth rates.
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics - By clusters ...continued
POLREG1 (32) countries
Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis JB Obs.
GDPPC 2914.466 34378.9 125.267 5270.849 3.547442 16.6335 5354.087 544
ITARR 0.874653 103.5508 0.001814 4.748821 18.82236 403.5606 3668960 544
ITEXP 2662.718 1298055 1.216888 55655.98 23.24171 541.4484 6620648 544
ITRCPT 910.451 310652.3 0.211532 13324.07 23.15748 538.8291 6556512 544
GDPPCGR 0.03672 0.322496 -0.155308 0.044906 0.688853 10.09238 1113.6 512
ITARRGR -0.040458 1.285837 -3.187505 0.334261 -3.505746 32.99917 20247.7 512
ITEXPGR -0.042826 1.597482 -4.056758 0.380428 -2.677258 29.33492 15406.91 512
ITRCPTGR -0.025152 3.486144 -3.693053 0.420858 -0.606085 26.3205 11633.39 512
POLREG2 (39) countries
Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis JB Obs.
GDPPC 5627.282 37582.7 203.053 7428.607 2.834821 10.96911 2642.375 663
ITARR 0.446066 21.86591 0.001305 1.203505 11.69013 177.1885 853288.5 663
ITEXP 195.5019 4556.744 0.931889 356.0236 5.448195 47.07758 56950.71 663
ITRCPT 266.3676 6726.391 1.351238 462.8785 6.816638 76.60701 154806.6 663
GDPPCGR 0.027245 0.150109 -0.192922 0.040107 -0.97212 6.514741 419.4704 624
ITARRGR -0.034254 0.768641 -2.289284 0.206598 -3.025277 29.18194 18774.69 624
ITEXPGR -0.000734 2.391994 -2.23065 0.266079 1.106608 29.7708 18760.93 624
ITRCPTGR -0.00225 1.704141 -2.398752 0.257225 -1.232902 20.37821 8010.138 624
POLREG3 (27) countries
Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis JB Obs.
GDPPC 26753.95 67804.5 700.928 15362.89 0.150702 2.523081 6.087403 459
ITARR 0.874607 3.798314 0.022792 0.692816 1.784237 6.479978 475.1464 459
ITEXP 772.6651 3261.766 36.34653 580.4 1.308623 5.102749 215.568 459
ITRCPT 959.8384 3606.833 33.34613 627.9668 1.436449 5.780789 305.7385 459
GDPPCGR 0.019711 0.146214 -0.153913 0.029905 -0.706479 7.859152 460.9406 432
ITARRGR -0.003179 1.109634 -0.742807 0.128016 1.125903 22.01634 6600.456 432
ITEXPGR 0.013523 0.978605 -0.870858 0.154796 0.413124 12.1086 1505.687 432
ITRCPTGR 0.015421 1.052049 -0.656403 0.14989 1.119122 14.53012 2483.162 432
GOVEFF1 (35) countries
Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis JB Obs.
GDPPC 1492.196 6649.4 125.267 1476.148 1.522123 4.630699 295.6807 595
ITARR 0.508723 103.5508 0.001814 4.3452 22.54068 533.4308 7025689 595
ITEXP 2367.745 1298055 1.216888 53219.96 24.31399 592.4431 8672321 595
ITRCPT 680.9575 310652.3 0.211532 12738.98 24.27412 591.1413 8634122 595
GDPPCGR 0.02998 0.285407 -0.155726 0.043554 0.236792 7.682221 516.7744 560
ITARRGR -0.069282 1.285837 -3.187505 0.330672 -3.162811 30.70035 18837.53 560
ITEXPGR -0.062835 2.391994 -4.056758 0.387747 -1.788357 27.52489 14332.81 560
ITRCPTGR -0.049642 3.486144 -3.693053 0.410897 -0.681543 25.56082 11919.8 560
GOVEFF2 (40) countries
Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis JB Obs.
GDPPC 5837.82 31263.5 405.35 6068.463 2.182968 7.86449 1210.532 680
ITARR 0.969212 21.86591 0.001305 1.850291 4.849667 36.44023 34349.23 680
ITEXP 222.4035 2125.871 0.931889 296.682 2.851759 12.77811 3630.679 680
ITRCPT 753.8852 8978.95 1.351238 1318.54 3.356598 15.3984 5632.309 680
GDPPCGR 0.028622 0.322496 -0.155308 0.040264 0.014515 9.15975 1011.823 640
ITARRGR -0.018181 0.970898 -2.289284 0.1974 -3.02321 34.7349 27831.01 640
ITEXPGR -0.000282 2.078599 -2.23065 0.236504 -0.667165 26.67999 15000.6 640
ITRCPTGR 0.005256 1.981734 -2.398752 0.246701 -0.889482 25.90244 14071.64 640
GOVEFF3 (38) countries
Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis JB Obs.
GDPPC 26660.28 87716.7 3280.84 16668.3 0.762945 3.579963 71.72474 646
ITARR 1.185543 9.869915 0.022792 1.188352 2.688564 14.29606 4212.849 646
ITEXP 1027.307 8199.729 55.00152 1140.751 3.23502 16.96327 6374.794 646
ITRCPT 1404.794 10408.07 33.34613 1567.781 2.898439 12.67068 3421.804 646
GDPPCGR 0.022109 0.13957 -0.192922 0.034898 -0.917262 8.071646 736.8724 608
ITARRGR 0.001819 0.699153 -0.742807 0.108092 -0.031385 11.68228 1909.775 608
ITEXPGR 0.026918 1.75432 -0.809338 0.158608 1.728903 28.08495 16244.01 608
ITRCPTGR 0.024102 1.704141 -0.556933 0.152618 2.456712 30.5076 19780.51 608
JB denote Jarque-Bera. * indicates 1 percent levels of significance. GR at the end of the acronym indicates
growth rates.
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Table 5: Panel unit root test results
H0: Unit root
Variables LLC IPS
All countries GDPPC 14.3898 [1.0000] 13.9554 [1.0000]
ITARR 6.32751 [1.0000] 12.3689 [1.0000]
ITEXP 9.91348 [1.0000] 13.8862 [1.0000]
ITRCPT 9.37332 [1.0000] 15.7990 [1.0000]
GDPPCGR -24.3474*** [0.0000] -16.8728*** [0.0000]
ITARRGR -28.1292*** [0.0000] -23.0880*** [0.0000]
ITEXPGR -28.7641*** [0.0000] -23.3049*** [0.0000]
ITRCPTGR -26.6004*** [0.0000] -21.6964*** [0.0000]
Developed countries GDPPC -7.87582*** [0.0000] -2.50518*** [0.0061]
ITARR -0.57004 [0.2843] 2.31223 [0.9896]
ITEXP 2.93563 [0.9983] 4.84224 [1.0000]
ITRCPT 2.84730 [0.9978] 6.43783 [1.0000]
GDPPCGR -7.16558*** [0.0000] -4.76549*** [0.0000]
ITARRGR -9.42173*** [0.0000] -9.42644*** [0.0000]
ITEXPGR -13.6626*** [0.0000] -9.48820*** [0.0000]
ITRCPTGR -13.6174*** [0.0000] -10.1013*** [0.0000]
Developing countries GDPPC 17.2937 [1.0000] 16.8680 [1.0000]
ITARR 7.11755 [1.0000] 12.7408 [1.0000]
ITEXP 9.66687 [1.0000] 13.1233 [1.0000]
ITRCPT 8.94538 [1.0000] 14.4477 [1.0000]
GDPPCGR -23.5334*** [0.0000] -16.4886*** [0.0000]
ITARRGR -26.6278*** [0.0000] -21.1095*** [0.0000]
ITEXPGR -25.3588*** [0.0000] -21.3227*** [0.0000]
ITRCPTGR -22.9974*** [0.0000] -19.2041*** [0.0000]
TTCI1 GDPPC 12.9575 [1.0000] 10.8270 [1.0000]
ITARR 4.39580 [1.0000] 7.49839 [1.0000]
ITEXP 2.78273 [0.9973] 4.85496 [1.0000]
ITRCPT 3.71093 [0.9999] 5.94884 [1.0000]
GDPPCGR -9.87923*** [0.0000] -8.96307*** [0.0000]
ITARRGR -17.5590*** [0.0000] -14.1157*** [0.0000]
ITEXPGR -13.8137*** [0.0000] -12.2627*** [0.0000]
ITRCPTGR -14.0937*** [0.0000] -11.4513*** [0.0000]
TTCI2 GDPPC 8.08290 [1.0000] 11.6414 [1.0000]
ITARR 6.47539 [1.0000] 9.78823 [1.0000]
ITEXP 8.92717 [1.0000] 11.1220 [1.0000]
ITRCPT 6.66658 [1.0000] 11.0677 [1.0000]
GDPPCGR -19.8620*** [0.0000] -12.2324*** [0.0000]
ITARRGR -18.6781*** [0.0000] -14.2515*** [0.0000]
ITEXPGR -18.0525*** [0.0000] -14.2542*** [0.0000]
ITRCPTGR -15.6079*** [0.0000] -12.9300*** [0.0000]
TTCI3 GDPPC -6.90756 [0.0000] -0.79006 [0.2147]
ITARR -0.84876 [0.1980] 3.60183 [0.9998]
ITEXP 5.03220 [1.0000] 7.36382 [1.0000]
ITRCPT 4.78715 [1.0000] 8.94042 [1.0000]
GDPPCGR -9.05792*** [0.0000] -6.71182*** [0.0000]
ITARRGR -11.5706*** [0.0000] -11.1243*** [0.0000]
ITEXPGR -15.1033*** [0.0000] -11.3332*** [0.0000]
ITRCPTGR -14.7495*** [0.0000] -11.0379*** [0.0000]
TOURSPEC1 GDPPC 14.6899 [1.0000] 9.72614 [1.0000]
ITARR 4.55456 [1.0000] 9.39832 [1.0000]
ITEXP 4.69081 [1.0000] 8.21386 [1.0000]
ITRCPT 5.36926 [1.0000] 9.82557 [1.0000]
GDPPCGR -14.3477*** [0.0000] -10.8202*** [0.0000]
ITARRGR -20.4709*** [0.0000] -16.2174*** [0.0000]
ITEXPGR -20.8020*** [0.0000] -17.3855*** [0.0000]
ITRCPTGR -18.0288*** [0.0000] -15.0796*** [0.0000]
TOURSPEC2 GDPPC 6.08661 [1.0000] 10.1445 [1.0000]
ITARR 5.88017 [1.0000] 8.52230 [1.0000]
ITEXP 5.73984 [1.0000] 8.38120 [1.0000]
ITRCPT 6.95799 [1.0000] 9.85084 [1.0000]
GDPPCGR -17.7256*** [0.0000] -11.6639*** [0.0000]
ITARRGR -16.5620*** [0.0000] -13.5167*** [0.0000]
ITEXPGR -14.8273*** [0.0000] -12.3506*** [0.0000]
ITRCPTGR -14.5946*** [0.0000] -11.5227*** [0.0000]
TOURSPEC3 GDPPC -0.18335 [0.4273] 3.29062 [0.9995]
ITARR 0.15330 [0.5609] 2.52670 [0.9942]
ITEXP 6.79614 [1.0000] 7.62149 [1.0000]
ITRCPT 4.02817 [1.0000] 7.62015 [1.0000]
GDPPCGR -8.57898*** [0.0000] -6.21112*** [0.0000]
ITARRGR -10.3643*** [0.0000] -9.44451*** [0.0000]
ITEXPGR -13.3387*** [0.0000] -9.64366*** [0.0000]
ITRCPTGR -13.0332*** [0.0000] -10.5636*** [0.0000]
The numbers in brackets denote p-values. The LLC and IPS tests are performed using the Newey–West bandwidth
selection with Barlett Kernel, and the Schwartz Bayesian Criterion is used to determine to optimal lag length.
GR at the end of the acronym indicates growth rates. *, ** and *** indicate rejection of the null hypothesis at
the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels of significance, respectively.
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Table 5: Panel unit root test results ...continued
H0: Unit root
Variables LLC IPS
COSTLIV1 GDPPC 14.7774 [1.0000] 14.6962 [1.0000]
ITARR 6.93101 [1.0000] 10.2242 [1.0000]
ITEXP 9.90525 [1.0000] 11.3838 [1.0000]
ITRCPT 7.22396 [1.0000] 11.8055 [1.0000]
GDPPCGR -17.5428*** [0.0000] -10.5848*** [0.0000]
ITARRGR -19.5179*** [0.0000] -15.4341*** [0.0000]
ITEXPGR -18.7347*** [0.0000] -15.0979*** [0.0000]
ITRCPTGR -16.9381*** [0.0000] -14.7236*** [0.0000]
COSTLIV2 GDPPC 0.80425 [0.7894] 3.28722 [0.9995]
ITARR 0.05242 [0.5209] 4.11229 [1.0000]
ITEXP 2.51660 [0.9941] 5.17249 [1.0000]
ITRCPT 2.99717 [0.9986] 6.29448 [1.0000]
GDPPCGR -9.82673*** [0.0000] -6.93240*** [0.0000]
ITARRGR -9.99918*** [0.0000] -8.91552*** [0.0000]
ITEXPGR -10.1761*** [0.0000] -8.64017*** [0.0000]
ITRCPTGR -10.2984*** [0.0000] -7.43545*** [0.0000]
COSTLIV3 GDPPC -6.11071*** [0.0000] -1.31428* [0.0944]
ITARR -0.47560 [0.3172] 2.58328 [0.9951]
ITEXP 4.18508 [1.0000] 6.55167 [1.0000]
ITRCPT 3.15256 [0.9992] 6.78041 [1.0000]
GDPPCGR -7.79155*** [0.0000] -4.96486*** [0.0000]
ITARRGR -10.6082*** [0.0000] -9.46985*** [0.0000]
ITEXPGR -13.0708*** [0.0000] -9.10752*** [0.0000]
ITRCPTGR -13.6336*** [0.0000] -9.86753*** [0.0000]
POLREG1 GDPPC 16.7352 [1.0000] 13.0879 [1.0000]
ITARR 6.45275 [1.0000] 10.0132 [1.0000]
ITEXP 10.0450 [1.0000] 9.70755 [1.0000]
ITRCPT 7.74476 [1.0000] 10.8190 [1.0000]
GDPPCGR -15.4104*** [0.0000] -10.9596*** [0.0000]
ITARRGR -13.0589*** [0.0000] -11.6446*** [0.0000]
ITEXPGR -13.7357*** [0.0000] -12.7005*** [0.0000]
ITRCPTGR -14.5360*** [0.0000] -12.0579*** [0.0000]
POLREG2 GDPPC 6.27527 [1.0000] 10.9565 [1.0000]
ITARR 4.30978 [1.0000] 7.73564 [1.0000]
ITEXP 5.03177 [1.0000] 8.60994 [1.0000]
ITRCPT 4.80054 [1.0000] 8.51076 [1.0000]
GDPPCGR -15.4186*** [0.0000] -10.8160*** [0.0000]
ITARRGR -19.8876*** [0.0000] -14.6368*** [0.0000]
ITEXPGR -17.8061*** [0.0000] -13.6684*** [0.0000]
ITRCPTGR -14.8223*** [0.0000] -12.7198*** [0.0000]
POLREG3 GDPPC -4.97853*** [0.0000] 0.26557 [0.6047]
ITARR -0.58580 [0.2790] 3.25526 [0.9994]
ITEXP 3.33703 [0.9996] 5.57201 [1.0000]
ITRCPT 3.61969 [0.9999] 7.17670 [1.0000]
GDPPCGR -7.80747*** [0.0000] -5.59581*** [0.0000]
ITARRGR -11.8088*** [0.0000] -11.0657*** [0.0000]
ITEXPGR -13.8568*** [0.0000] -10.4029*** [0.0000]
ITRCPTGR -12.5308*** [0.0000] -9.41507*** [0.0000]
GOVEFF1 GDPPC 16.4313 [1.0000] 12.9248 [1.0000]
ITARR 4.72238 [1.0000] 8.15357 [1.0000]
ITEXP 3.98317 [1.0000] 5.94292 [1.0000]
ITRCPT 6.53333 [1.0000] 9.99262 [1.0000]
GDPPCGR -11.0004*** [0.0000] -9.81552*** [0.0000]
ITARRGR -15.4156*** [0.0000] -13.1614*** [0.0000]
ITEXPGR -13.6546*** [0.0000] -12.4238*** [0.0000]
ITRCPTGR -14.1224*** [0.0000] -11.7952*** [0.0000]
GOVEFF2 GDPPC 7.66411 [1.0000] 10.6261 [1.0000]
ITARR 6.40165 [1.0000] 9.20338 [1.0000]
ITEXP 8.17786 [1.0000] 10.2757 [1.0000]
ITRCPT 4.80897 [1.0000] 8.24106 [1.0000]
GDPPCGR -17.7393*** [0.0000] -10.4542*** [0.0000]
ITARRGR -19.0352*** [0.0000] -13.9741*** [0.0000]
ITEXPGR -16.7707*** [0.0000] -13.3398*** [0.0000]
ITRCPTGR -16.7773*** [0.0000] -13.3528*** [0.0000]
GOVEFF3 GDPPC -5.65948*** [0.0000] 0.61702 [0.7314]
ITARR -0.70462 [0.2405] 4.07887 [1.0000]
ITEXP 4.61979 [1.0000] 7.72947 [1.0000]
ITRCPT 4.87114 [1.0000] 9.18860 [1.0000]
GDPPCGR -12.6359*** [0.0000] -8.95215*** [0.0000]
ITARRGR -14.0090*** [0.0000] -12.8417*** [0.0000]
ITEXPGR -19.4033*** [0.0000] -14.5802*** [0.0000]
ITRCPTGR -15.1140*** [0.0000] -12.3968*** [0.0000]
The numbers in brackets denote p-values. The LLC and IPS tests are performed using the Newey–West bandwidth
selection with Barlett Kernel, and the Schwartz Bayesian Criterion is used to determine to optimal lag length.
GR at the end of the acronym indicates growth rates. *, ** and *** indicate rejection of the null hypothesis at
the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels of significance, respectively.
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